SOC2 Compliance Checklist — opencode_initializer v3.0¶

Based on: T1.5 corporate/air-gap audit (2026-08-08), v3.0 vision Target: SOC2 Type II readiness for AI-assisted development harness

CC5.2 — Control Activities¶

#	Control	v3.0 Implementation	Status
CC5.2.1	Provider allowlist per project	`model-policy.json` with `allowed_providers` per deployment profile	→ M5.1.3
CC5.2.2	Model allowlist per project	`model-policy.json` with `allowed_models` per project override	→ M5.1.3
CC5.2.3	Cost limits per session	`OPENCODE_MAX_COST_PER_SESSION` in model-policy	→ M5.3.3
CC5.2.4	Data residency enforcement	`OPENCODE_DATA_REGIONS` gate in provider selection	→ M5.1.3
CC5.2.5	Per-agent model assignment	17-project.sh agent→model mapping (existing, v2.0.3)	✅

#	Control	v3.0 Implementation	Status
CC7.2.1	Audit log all tool calls	44-audit.sh: WAL event `tool_call` (bash, read, write, edit, grep)	→ M5.2.3
CC7.2.2	Audit log all model calls	44-audit.sh: WAL event `model_call` (provider, model, tokens in/out, latency)	→ M5.2.3
CC7.2.3	Audit log provider switches	44-audit.sh: WAL event `provider_switch` (from→to, reason)	→ M5.2.3
CC7.2.4	PII redaction logging	44-audit.sh: WAL event `pii_redacted` (count, patterns matched)	→ M5.2.4
CC7.2.5	Session boundary logging	WAL event `session_boundary` (start/end, task_id, mode)	→ M5.2.3
CC7.2.6	Error/exception logging	WAL event `error` (tool, exit_code, message_hash)	→ M5.3.1
CC7.2.7	Scheduled security scanning	Systemd timer: daily Trivy + Qodana scan with log	→ M5.4.1

#	Control	v3.0 Implementation	Status
CC8.2.1	Immutable WAL (hash chain)	SHA-256 per-entry hash linking (`prev_hash` → `this_hash`)	→ M5.2.3
CC8.2.2	WAL rotation policy	>10MB → gzip compress + archive to Qdrant	→ M5.2.3
CC8.2.3	WAL access control	`~/.cache/opencode/wal.jsonl` chmod 600, directory 700	→ M5.2.3
CC8.2.4	Sanitized logs (no secrets)	PII guard strips API keys, tokens, credentials before write	→ M5.2.4
CC8.2.5	SBOM generation	CycloneDX SBOM via `trivy sbom` on every release	→ M5.4.1
CC8.2.6	Dependency vulnerability scan	Trivy filesystem scan + OSV integration in CI	→ M5.4.1

#	Control	v3.0 Implementation	Status
CM.1	Traceable spec→task→commit	SDD workflow: FR-### in spec → task_id in plan → commit message	✅ (v3.0 SDD)
CM.2	Pre-commit security hook	`.pre-commit-config.yaml`: Trivy CRITICAL check	→ M5.4.1
CM.3	Supply-chain verification	`curl\|bash` → download + SHA256 verify for all 6 modules	→ M5.1.2
CM.4	Config backup/restore	`dev backup create\|list\|restore` (existing, v2.0.3)	✅

Risk	Likelihood	Impact	Mitigation
API key leak via logs	Medium	Critical	PII guard (45-pii-guard.sh) + WAL sanitization
Unauthorized provider usage	Medium	High	Model governance (43-governance.sh) + allowlist
Supply chain compromise	Low	Critical	SHA256 verification (M5.1.2)
Air-gap circuit leak	Medium	High	ISOLATED_CIRCUIT guard on version-check + autoupdate (M5.1.1)
WAL tampering	Low	High	SHA-256 hash chain (M5.2.3)
Default password exploit	High	Medium	Auto-generated secrets (M5.1.2)